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An End to Qualia? Dennett's Defense of Heterophenomenology 
Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness 
By Daniel C. Dennett. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 199 pp. Cloth, $28.00. 
Forgoing recent excursions into the philosophical implications of neo-Darwinism 
and free will, Dennett returns to his roots, defending both his theory of conscious 
ness (the multiple-drafts model) and his methodological approach (heterophe 
nomenology) from recent critics. For those unfamiliar with Dennett's philosophy 
of mind, be prepared to incrementally agree with a persuasive, clear, and creative 
writer until reaching perhaps the most nonintuitive conclusion possible: There 
is no conscious entity that requires explanation. In Sweet Dreams, Dennett goes 
on the offensive against the "new mysterians," those who argue that the problem 
of consciousness is fundamentally unsolvable or requires an explanatory frame 
work outside that used by observational science. Along the way, we encounter a 
gallery of philosophical troublemakers, circus performers who would make even 
Barnum hesitant, including a plethora of possible zombies, Martian scientists, 
cunning magicians, replicant impostors, emotionally inverted color perceivers, 
and a trio of imprisoned color scientists: the original Mary, the struck-by-lightning 
brain-reorganized Swamp-Mary, and the color-challenged Robotic Mark-19 Mary. 
Although Dennett is unmatched (save perhaps Dawkins in biology) in communi 
cating complex ideas in ways that resonate with readers, the current work is less 
unified than most recent efforts, consisting of a series of reworked papers and ad 
dresses given over the past 7 years, focused on specific criticisms and elaborations 
of his approach. Each of the first five chapters is autonomous, and comments are 
presented sequentially. The remaining three chapters are re-presentations of this 
initial material, adding new slants to the discussion but little new content. 
Chapter 1: The Zombic hunch 
Dennett begins his assault on the new mysterians (e.g., Chomsky, Chalmers, Sear 
le) by addressing one of the oldest: Leibniz. In Monadology, Leibniz (1714/1898) 
states that perception is inexplicable on mechanical grounds, claiming that if one 
built a machine that was able to perceive, an inspection of its gears would never 
lend an explanation of unitary perception. Dennett believes that an essential 
misconception present in this argument underlies similar arguments today. 
Leibniz never argues that perception is nondecomposable; he simply asserts 
the fact, and Dennett claims that the new mysterians perform the same move 
with regard to consciousness. Assertion is not argument, and so "surely it must be 
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the case that" thought experiments use what Dennett calls an "intuition pump," 
often containing concealed premises and biases. Ultimately, intuitions are a thin 
basis for theory: Our intuitions may differ from each other or simply be wrong. 
Also, our conceptual tools for addressing complex questions may develop over 
time, altering what an explanation might look like and changing our intuitions of 
what is possible. For example, computers and the advent of the algorithm allow 
us to understand evolution in a new way (e.g., see Dennett, 1995); why should we 
simply give up once and for all on an empirically based theory of consciousness? 
A properly developed computational approach, with levels of processing interact 
ing on many levels, may ultimately do the trick. Among the new mysterians who 
walk this intuitionist road, Dennett cites Nagel, Chomsky, Strawson, Penrose, and 
most notably Chalmers (a self-avowed dualist who simply believes that conscious 
ness is a nonreducible fundamental property of the universe, much like quarks 
or electrons; Chalmers, 1996). 
In addition, Dennett faults many new mysterians for believing that discoveries 
in nondeterministic physics will eventually win the day by somehow introducing 
some mental causation wiggle room into the equation. In Freedom Evolves (2003) 
Dennett points out that true randomness buys one nothing with regard to mental 
causation, and Dennett makes a similar argument here. Assume that quantum 
effects allow for qualia, the what-it-is-like-to-be-something phenomenon. We are 
still stuck with the problem of why organized collections of neurons, like our 
own brains (unlike a collection of neurons in a petri dish), are capable of com 
plex computational states, such as representation. Because quantum effects exist 
in both cases, an explanation must occur at a higher level: the communication 
and relationship between cells. Because one needs a computational account of 
complex information processing to account for this distinction, it is unclear what 
quantum-level interventions contribute to overall explanations. 
Dennett argues that such radical interventions are necessary only if one buys 
into the Zombic hunch: the belief that a perfect computational duplicate of a 
person lacking qualia (a zombie) is fundamentally different from a normal person 
possessing qualia. According to the doctrine of "Zombism," because computational 
explanations fail to account for this difference, they are explanatorily insufficient. 
Dennett responds that a theory need make such a distinction only if one believes 
in a dichotomy between the things that possess consciousness and those that do 
not. If one denies this difference, no such demarcation criterion is necessary or 
even makes sense. The burden of proof is on the mysterians, and Dennett claims 
that the "Zombic hunch" is an intuition that will fade in time, alongside other 
seemingly erroneous beliefs. 
Chapter 2: A third-person approach to consciousness 
In chapter 2, Dennett turns to a defense of his explanatory framework: het 
erophenomenology (HP), a project more extensively introduced in Conscious 
ness Explained (199 1). He begins by suggesting that we use standard third-person 
observational techniques in examining consciousness and see how far such an 
investigation takes us. To prevent us from sneaking shared introspection into our 
account, we are joined in this endeavor by alien anthropologists, capable of data 
collection and inference but unable (at least before collecting data) to know what 
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explanations fail to account for this difference, they are explanatorily insufficient.
Dennett responds that a theory need make such a distinction only if one believes
in a dichotomy between the things that possess consciousness and those that do
not. If one denies this difference, no such demarcation criterion is necessary or
even makes sense. The burden of proof is on the mysterians, and Dennett claims
that the "Zombic hunch" is an intuition that will fade in ti e, alongside other
seemingly erroneous beliefs.
Chapter 2: A third-person approach to consciousness
In chapter 2, Dennett turns to a defense of his explanatory fra e ork: het-
erophenomenology (HP), a project more extensively introduced in Conscious-
ness Explained (1991). He begins by suggesting that we use standard third-person
observational techniques in examining consciousness and see how far such an
investigation takes us. To prevent us fro sneaking shared introspection into our
account, we are joined in this endeavor by alien anthropologists, capable of data
collection and inference but unable (at least before collecting data) to know what
it is like to be us. For the new mysterians, the situation is a nonstarter. But for HP, 
the fact that people report having a qualitative experience is simply another piece 
of behavior that needs to be explained, alongside other pieces of evidence (e.g., 
movie voiceovers, philosophical treatises on consciousness) that indicate people 
believe they possess a unique subjective point of view. (This view is what separates 
Dennett from epiphenomenalism: If qualia were truly noncausal, we would not be 
able to speak of it. The fact that we can means something is going on that needs 
to be explained.) 
Dennett argues that all third-person investigations are limited; whatever we 
study, there will always be some residual uncertainty (e.g., the next significant 
digit, probabilistic assumptions of prior locations or environmental conditions). 
The same applies to consciousness. There will always be some knowledge that 
remains incomplete or uncertain, but this is true in every third-person inquiry. A 
failure to arrive at complete knowledge of consciousness via a standard scientific 
approach is philosophically problematic only if one believes one has complete 
and infallible knowledge of consciousness from a first-person approach. However, 
Dennett shows that this is not the case: Our intuitions about our own experience 
are fallible (e.g., with regard to the capacity of nonfoveal visual perception), and 
many third-person descriptions actually are richer than a first-person account 
(e.g., with regard to masked priming or blindsight, where we have no conscious 
experience that we have been affected by stimuli). 
In most areas of inquiry, counterintuitive findings often are seen as great ad 
vances, but with regard to consciousness, such conclusions inexplicably indicate 
that one's theory must be wrong. This is particularly strange because our intuitions 
regarding the nature of our experience often have been shown to be misguided. 
Returning to the example of our visual perception, simple psychophysical tests 
reveal visual acuity and color perception only in central vision, a fact contrary to 
our experience. Do we then ask, 
"Why, since people's visual fields are detailed and colored all the way out (that's what 
they tell us), can't they identify things they see moving in the parafoveal parts of their 
visual fields?" (p. 41) 
or, more properly, 
"Why do people think that their visual fields are detailed all the way out?" (p. 41) 
The HP approach involves gathering a corpus of material that is then subject 
to analysis. This consists of all of a person's physically observable behavior (e.g., 
global actions of the individual, neural and biochemical states), and includes 
speech behaviors referring to the belief that we have qualia, and zombies do 
not have qualia, that we have experiences that are uniquely our own, and so 
on. Communicative actions are then interpreted in the context of brain states, 
environmental conditions, and so on, to determine anthropologically our belief 
systems about consciousness, and these beliefs become part of what needs to be 
explained. 
Whenever belief ascription occurs, Dennett claims we are simply adopting an 
explanatory framework: the intentional stance. For Dennett, teleological belief 
desire talk is neutral with regard to whether entities metaphysically possess these 
it is like to be us. For the new mysterians, the situation is a nonstarter. But for HP,
the fact that people report having a qualitative experience is simply another piece
of behavior that needs to be explained, alongside other pieces of evidence (e.g.,
movie voiceovers, philosophical treatises on consciousness) that indicate people
believe they possess a unique subjective point ofvie . (This view is what separates
Dennett fro epiphenomenalism: If qualia were truly noncausal, we would not be
able to speak of it. The fact that we can means something is going on that needs
to be explained.)
Dennett argues that all third-person investigations are limited; whatever we
study, there will always be some residual uncertainty (e.g., the next significant
digit, probabilistic assumptions of prior locations or environmental conditions).
The same applies to consciousness. There will always be some knowledge that
remains incomplete or uncertain, but this is true in every third-person inquiry. A
failure to arrive at complete knowledge of consciousness via a standard scientific
approach is philosophically problematic only if one believes one has complete
and infallible knowledge ofconsciousness fro a first-person approach. However,
Dennett shows that this is not the case: Our intuitions about our own experience
are fallible (e.g., with regard to the capacity of nonfoveal visual perception), and
many third-person descriptions actually are richer t an a first- ers a count
(e.g., with regard to masked priming or blindsight, where we have no conscious
experience that we have been affected by stimuli).
In most areas of inquiry, counterintuitive findings often are seen as great ad-
vances, but with regard to consciousness, such conclusions inexplicably indicate
that one's theory must be wrong. This is particularly strange because our int iti s
regarding the nature of our experience often have b en shown t be misguided.
Returning to the example of our visual perception, simple psychophysical tests
reveal visual acuity and color perception only in central vision, a fact contrary t
our experience. Do we then ask,
" hy, since people's visual fields are detailed and colored all the way out (that's what
they tell us), can't they identify things they see moving in the parafoveal parts of their
visual fields?" (p. 41)
or, more properly,
"Why do people think that their visual fields are detailed all the way out?" (p. 41)
The HP approach involves gathering a corpus of material t at is t en subject
to analysis. This consists of all of a person's physically observable behavior (e.g.,
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speech behaviors referring to the belief that we have qualia, and zombies do
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on. Co municative actions are then interpreted in the context of brain states,
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Whenever belief ascription occurs, Dennett claims we are simply adopting an
explanatory fra e ork: the intentional stance. For Dennett, teleological belief-
desire talk is neutral with regard to whether entities metaphysically possess these
propositional attitudes and is applicable to thermostats as easily as humans (Den 
nett, 1978). Because the intentional stance is neutral regarding qualia, a zombie 
will have exactly the same ascriptions assigned to it as a nonzombie (including 
the assertion that it has qualia, too). Therefore, whether a zombie actually has 
qualia (or, more to the point, whether we actually have qualia) makes absolutely 
no difference to the analysis and becomes moot. In the end, there is nothing to 
be explained: A complete explanation of the zombie is identical to a complete 
explanation of a nonzombie. One is reminded of James's famous verificationist 
motto, "A difference that makes no difference, is no difference." 
Chapter 3: Explaining the "magic" of consciousness 
In the brief chapter 3, Dennett presents two incompatible views of what an 
explanation of consciousness is should look like. For Dennett, an exorcism of the 
homunculus in the explanans (e.g., asjust performed in the previous discussion) 
is a necessary component for a noncircular account. However, the new mysterians 
argue that any such approach cannot really be an explanation because qualia are 
nowhere to be seen. Conversely, Dennett argues that any explanation that leaves 
the homunculus in has not really explained anything at all. The conflict seems 
intractable, but Dennett suggests that perhaps the issue would go away with a 
proper understanding of "the hard problem" (a term coined by Chalmers referring 
to the qualia-related puzzles that seem resistant to computational explanation). 
To this end, Dennett discusses a famous trick by magician Ralph Hull: the tuned 
deck. Upon performing a standard find-the-card trick, Hull challenged anyone to 
figure out how he performed it. He then performed the same trick with a second 
technique different from the first, and subsequently a third technique, and so 
on. Any hypothesis was pursuing a moving target, and the trick was simply in the 
title: "the tuned deck." Dennett hypothesizes that the hard problem represents a 
similar situation, a collection of problems that seem unified but may be amenable 
to divide-and-conquer strategies of computational analysis. 
Chapter 4: Are qualia what make life worth living? 
Back on the offensive, Dennett puts the burden of proof on the opposition and 
challenges the new mysterians to define their key term: What exactly is a quale? A 
negative definition will not do (it is what zombies do not have), nor will defining 
it as the phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. Dennett asks, "Which aspects of 
our experience are phenomenal and which are not?" (p. 79). Consider change 
blindness: Before one notices the change, are there differences in qualia when 
one views the two visual scenes? Certainly there were physiologic differences (e.g., 
in the retina). If one claims there are differences in qualia without one perceiving 
them, one begins to question the basis of the whole enterprise (i.e., that one is an 
absolute authority about one's own qualia). If one does not have access to one's 
own qualia, who does? On the other hand, if one denies there are differences 
in qualia before and after detection, now qualia occur only when you claim they 
do. Because zombies insist they have qualia too, this should be sufficient to give it 
to them! Dennett finishes the chapter by proposing a version of the classic color 
inversion situation, in which one wakes up one morning with one's emotional 
reaction to colors inverted (e.g., my favorite color used to be blue, now it is yel 
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low). Are qualia inverted in this case? The answer is unclear, and Dennett argues 
that qualia are simply ill-conceived constructs. 
Chapter 5: What RoboMary knows 
In chapter 5, we encounter permutations of FrankJackson's classic "Mary the 
color scientist" scenario. In the original, Mary is imprisoned in a monochromatic 
environment and asked to research color vision. She ultimately learns all there is 
to know about color from a third-person perspective. The new mysterians argue 
that there is still something she does not know about color: qualia, what it is like to 
experientially see that color. Show her a blue banana, and she will say, "Oh, that's 
what yellow looks like." Dennett begins by challenging that Mary really would be 
surprised: What would knowing all about color vision really entail? Might it not 
result in her recognizing the blue banana? He argues that our intuitions about 
knowing everything there is to know about color are somewhat murky and point 
toward a thought experiment with hidden biases. 
More directly, if the argument made by the new mysterians is that qualia are 
ineffable and thus noninferential from third-person data (Lycan), what evidence 
is there for such ineffability? Might not someone who knew everythingabout color 
be able to "eff' it? Again, the mysterians simply assert, not argue. Closing the 
chapter, Dennett introduces RoboMary, the mechanical version of Mary, who has 
black-and-white movie cameras mounted on a visual system otherwise enabled 
for color vision. Dennett argues that because colorization can be accomplished 
computationally, there is nothing RoboMary would gain from the introduction of 
actual color cameras (I suspect this latter argument is preaching to the converted, 
sitting nicely with those who agree with Dennett but having no effect on those 
denying strong artificial intelligence). 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 
The final three chapters represent autonomous presentations of much of the 
material discussed thus far (one wonders why they were not presented as initial 
discussions rather than as the closing chapters). Discussed are distributed process 
ing, consciousness as the "winner" in global communication, whether an explana 
tion of consciousness needs to leave the subject out, and the coherence of the 
qualia concept. The final chapter provides a hypothetical informal discussion that 
illustrates the problems with the coherence of qualia discussed previously. Many 
of Dennett's arguments in these sections reiterate who has the burden of proof: 
I have argument, he claims, and the mysterians have only intuition. 
Comments 
Those familiar with Dennett's writings are in for the usual treat; his talent for 
producing enjoyable, thought-provoking expositions again is in full force. How 
ever, for those unfamiliar with his work, I recommend reading a more complete 
treatment of the subject in Consciousness Explained before tackling many of the 
ad hoc arguments he presents in the current work. The layout of the chapters is 
somewhat awkward, and I recommend reading the last three chapters first (which 
give a more coherent structure), followed by the first five chapters, which go into 
more detail on the various issues. 
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Dennett central complaint in Sweet Dreams is that criticisms of his position rest 
on unanalyzed intuition: "Surely that cannot be right." It is hard to find fault with 
this claim. In fact, if one can get over one's initial incredulity, one just may find 
one's intuitions changing over time. Reflections of one's own unity of conscious 
ness, possession of qualia, and so on, can change based on one's philosophical 
perspective. Dennett argues that our intuitions of whether an explanation of 
consciousness is possible may change with the development of new conceptual 
tools. Over the years, Dennett's work has changed my own intuitions regarding 
the nature of my personal consciousness and has served as precisely the kind of 
conceptual bootstrapping necessary to rethink what consciousness is. Though not 
his most unified work, Sweet Dreams is pure Dennett and worthwhile reading for 
anyone in the cognitive science community. 
Jason A. Williams 
Department of Psycholoy 
Gonzaga University 
501 E. Boone Avenue, AD54 
Spokane, WA 99258 
E-mail: williamsj@gonzaga.edu 
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consciousness is possible may change with the development of new conceptual
tools. Over the years, Dennett's work has changed my own intuitions regarding
the nature of my personal consciousness and has served as precisely the kind of
conceptual bootstrapping necessary to rethink what consciousness is. Though not
his most unified work, Sweet Dreams is pure Dennett and worthwhile reading for
anyone in the cognitive science community.
Jason A. Williams
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